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Abstract: Islamic populism in Indonesia is perceived as an alliance of the people on behalf of the 
ummah in urban areas, against the ruling elites who enjoy the promises of peace and prosperity more 
than capitalism, modernism and democracy. This paper though intends to disclose the Islamic 
populism in rural areas through the power of capital and symbols as part of the suspension of 
differences between alliances in rural areas and large cities that simply focuses on political power. 
This research embraces the socio-cultural approach by applying the theory of generative structuralism 
penned by Pierre Bourdieu in order to analyze the resistance of suspension difference by invigorating 
the cultural reproduction and symbols dominance to thwart the ummah alliance in urban areas. The 
results of this research show that the Islamic populism in rural areas upholds the belief in salvation, 
peace and unity, by reinforcing the suspension differences among the congregations on various bases. 
In spite of domestication process in Islamic populism by the ruling elite, the ummah alliance in rural 
areas cannot be triggered due to their firm belief in salvation, which differs from the Islamic populism 
in large cities where a symbol of injustice of the bourgeoisie and the ruling elites prevails. The Islamic 
populism in rural areas has caused the failure of Islamic populism in large cities since their main 
discourse solely considers the middle class, in contrast to the Islamic populism in rural areas that 
might may welcome both the middle class and the lower class. 
Keywords: Cultural Reproduction; Indonesia; Islamic Populism; Rural; Salvation. 
Abstrak: Populisme Islam di Indonesia dilihat sebagai aliansi masyarakat mengatasnamakan umat di 
perkotaan, melawan elit penguasa yang dianggap lebih menikmati janji-janji kedamaian dan 
kesejahteraan dari kapitalisme, modernisme dan demokrasi. Sebaliknya, Tulisan ini hendak 
menunjukkan populisme Islam di pedesaan melalui kekuatan modal dan simbol-simbol yang menjadi 
bagian dari kekuatan penangguhan perbedaan (suspension of difference) aliansi umat ini sebagai 
pembanding terhadap aliansi umat di kota yang lebih fokus terhadap isi kekuasaan. Pendekatan yang 
digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah sosial-budaya dengan menerapkan teori strukturalisme 
generatif Bourdieu untuk menganalisis ketahanan suspension of difference melalui reproduksi 
budaya dan dominasi simbol-simbol yang digunakan dalam berkontestasi dengan aliansi umat di 
perkotaan. Hasil dalam penilitian ini menunjukkan populisme Islam di desa bergerak melalui tradisi 
yang didasari “imaginasi keselamatan”, kedamaian dan persatuan sebagai dasarnya, memiliki daya 
tahan dalam membangun suspension of difference di kalangan umat dengan basis yang beragam. 
Meskipun terdapat indikasi adanya proses domestikasi pada populisme Islam di Indonesia oleh elit 
penguasa, aliansi umat di pedesaan lebih cenderung tidak terpengaruh karena diskursus besarnya 
adalah keyakinan akan keselamatan, hal ini berbeda dengan populisme Islam di kota yang 
mengusung simbol ketidakadilan elit borjuis dan penguasa. Populisme Islam di desa juga menjadi 
penyebab gagalnya populisme Islam di kota karena diskursus yang digaungkan hanya menyentuh 
kelas menengah, berbeda dengan populisme Islam di desa yang dapat membaurkan kelas menengah 
dan bawah. 
Kata Kunci: Indonesia; Keselamatan; Populisme Islam; Pedesaan; Reproduksi Budaya. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decades, Indonesia has been under the spotlight of political scientists. They have 
specifically studied the alliance of ummah who are frequently present in major cities by raising the 
issue of upholding sharia to issues of justice and equality of people's welfare. There has not been any 
significant success of their resistance against the bourgeois elite, the rulers or other alliances outside the 
group that implicitly claims to be "moral". 
Since the establishment of the Indonesian government, as proven by historical records, no single 
Islamic party has been able to seize a full control of the parliament regarding the issues of justice and 
equality. Up to now, only the nationalist parties take control of the government headed by the oligarchic 
forces behind it (Jeffrey A. Winters, 2013; Robison & Hadiz, 2020; Zulham, 2020). As matter of fact, only 
two Islamic parties exist in the central parliament amongst the nine nationalist parties, namely the 
Partai Persatuan Pembanguan (PPP) and the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) which have been further 
weakened by the entry of the PPP party in supporting the government. Similarly, myriads of factions 
occur within the Indonesian Muslim society which have been eradicated by the government such as 
the Darul Islam (DI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as well as those that are still popular today, 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). 
On the other hand, there are ummah alliances in rural areas which embrace the symbols of belief 
in salvation through traditions. The salvation in question is a common belief shared within the people’s 
alliance regarding their hope in achieving a better life in this world, to gain success and health, and to 
survive in the afterlife. They call themselves the people of the nahdliyin. The traditions they uphold 
have existed within their lives and become part of their hereditary heritage used as a habit which is 
thoroughly in conformity with their social laws. They call it the nahdliyin tradition or the amaliyah 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The traditions they practice have actually transcended various ideologies and 
periods of world political economy. Starting from communist ideology, liberalism to Pancasila 
democracy; starting from the feudal period, colonial, imperialist, to the modernization of the free 
market. It is even said that the tradition practiced by the people of nahdliyin has been rooted deeply 
since the periodization of the songo guardians in the 15th century (Ricklefs, 2012). Thus, it is not 
surprising to see that this tradition which is equipped with special ritual has taken root and has been 
tested as a tradition that is part of the life of the nahdliyin people. 
The forerunner of this ummah alliance in rural areas sprouted through pesantren and traditional 
associations in the community (jamiyah) in traditional forms such as tarekat, tahlilan, selametan, 
syarwa'an, manaqiban and sholawatan which were led by kiai and local traditional leaders. The 
continuation of this tradition in its development was the formal institution of NU. The researcher's 
assessment has assessed that the tradition that has lived with the people of Nahdliyin has become part 
of daily rites and the community's adaptation system (Van Bruinessen & Wajidi, 2006), becoming a 
mindset in addressing the life of the nation and state (Fealy & Bush, 2014; Feillard, 2013), and has 
formed a culture of consensus in shaping a moderate and tolerant Islamic civilization (Brown, 2019). 
Nowadays, the ummah alliance in rural areas is showing its stretch by gathering large numbers of 
people through its jamiyah or majelis sholawat by carrying out ritual practices as practiced by the people 
of Nahdliyin. It can be ascertained that in all regional areas of Indonesia, especially in rural communities 
there is an alliance of ummah who carry this love of prayer. For example, in Probolinggo Regency, 
based on the narrative of the head of the PCNU da'wah Agency in Probolinggo district, Hafidz Hakiem 
Noer, roughly 48 prayer assemblies are reported, including tens of thousands of followers, namely 
Jamiyah Syubbanul Muslimin, Ahbabul Mustofa and Alwali. 
The activities conducted by members encourages the love of sholawat which is viewed as the 
amaliah NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), such as reading the simtudduror, diba ', barzanji, and tahlil—which is 
respectively a collection of Arabic texts, made by Middle Eastern scholars, is read to praise the Prophet 
Muhammad and believed by the people’s alliance as a mediator for salvation in this world and the 
hereafter. Other than carrying out the NU religious rituals, the implementation of a series of activities 
is filled with singing songs embracing the Indonesian love, like the national hymn known as the 
‘Indonesia Raya’ and the Syubbanul Wathon (Indonesian youth). Besides, there are also lectures or 
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religious speeches delivered by religious elites who they refer to as kiai or habib. The discourse presented 
in the lecture was about maintaining the NU traditions, loving the cleric, preserving the Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia  through an imaginary process of peace and salvation as voiced in religious 
doctrines, because unity is part of salvation considering that unity is peace in guaranteeing serenity 
while conducting worships. 
The ummah alliance in rural areas is not just a mere “mass culture” (N. Johnson, 2019; Macdonald, 
1953) that gathers only for a temporary goal on a mass basis that can easily split because its goals are 
only momentary and inconsistent. If observers see the ummah alliance in the cities, which is more 
viewed from their movements against political power, they call it Islamic populism, which makes it 
appropriate to consider that the alliance of ummah in rural areas is a variant of Islamic populism in 
Indonesia. 
Populism can be defined as a multi-class alliance movement that is asymmetrical, consisting of 
various classes and social status, with certain social groups which hold a dominant role, while others 
follow. The impact is the suspense of difference. The discourse used in these alliances tends to benefit 
the leading class (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Thus, the alliance of ummah in rural areas which have 
a diverse class base - although with a different goal from the alliance of ummah in major cities, which 
is to position themselves at peace with power but while maintaining the principles of tradition - 
deserves to be examined based on the Islamic populism perspective. 
This research is important since the Islamic populism, when considering the alliance of ummah in 
the rural areas, it is hardly spotlighted from the Islamic populism researchers, especially when it comes 
to socio-cultural approach. The existing research looks more at Islamic populism in large cities and uses 
a political-economy approach. Vedi Hadiz (2014), for example, highlights the Islamic populism with a 
political economy approach based in cities by comparing Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey. Its appearance 
is part of a disappointed response to the contradiction of the welfare promises of global capitalism. The 
growing ambition and frustration articulated by the urban middle class throughout the Muslim world, 
including in these three countries, is working with the urban poor population, the goal is to gain access 
to power and resources for the voiced of the oppressed. 
Based on political economic point of view, the Islamic populism is also perceived as a resistance 
movement against the ruling elite. Its existence always makes a difference between the ummah as moral 
and the immoral ruling elite. Thus, the produced label created new conflicts. Conflict never ceases to 
develop around the world when there is an enlargement of the issue of a new type of social 
marginalization and disillusionment with liberal modernity for breaking the promises (Hadiz & 
Chryssogelos, 2017). 
Also, based on political power point of view, another factor that causes the emergence of Islamic 
populism is the crisis of trust in democratic representation portrayed by the ruling elite. The promise 
of justice from a democratic system is considered as a failure for it creates a lot of inequality (Amal, 
2020). However, the latest development of a political approach about the Islamic populism in Indonesia 
finds that the Islamic populism movement is no longer intensive in voicing the reinforcement of a sharia 
state which views the democratic system as a failure, but has made peace with democracy in order to 
achieve a broader public support in hope to seize power and resources by conducting ummah based 
political identity (Hadiz, 2018). 
Failures not only prevail within the sharia state but also in the Islamic populism in major cities 
which have been perceived as a failure in getting the attention of the lower class and the bourgeoisie in 
Indonesia resulting in the fact that there has never been any success in urban populism in seizing power 
and economic resources from the ruling oligarchy. Unlike the case in Turkey, Islamic populism is 
formed from three forces, namely the blend of the middle class, the lower class and the Islamic 
bourgeoisie (Hadiz, 2016). As a result, the Islamic populism in Turkey has been able to overcome the 
dominance of the nationalist-curricular power of the Kemalist regime, and even to this day it controls 
the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) in hope to establish a project based on Islamic 
ideology cadres led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Yilmaz, 2018). 
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As far as the Islamic populism in electoral politics in Indonesia is concerned, especially regarding 
the 2019 presidential and vice presidential elections, the failure of Islamic populism in large cities is 
demonstrated by three things: first, the support for the democratic process which is still quite strong; 
second, the Islamic populism used by Prabowo's group is not part of the mainstream Islam in Indonesia; 
and third, historically speaking, the Islamic populism has always been contested massively in 
Indonesian politics so that its influence in politics can always be debated (Hara & Trihartono, 2019). 
Mainstream Islam in question is shown by other research represented by traditional moderate groups, 
namely the NU and Muhammadiyah. For instance, NU has a much larger base in rural areas. 
Mainstream Islam is even more inclined towards a democratic system and takes a position of peace 
with power and to distance itself from power without any frontal resistance (Adiwilaga, Mustofa, & 
Rahman, 2019). 
A thorough analysis has even been aimed at the Islamic populism in urban areas as a fragile 
Muslim alliance, because there is no single political facility in Indonesia that can effectively promote 
the aspirations of the ummah who are increasingly sociologically diverse. However, for the interests of 
the oligarchy, the Islamic populism still provides strong resources for political mobilization. Thus the 
Islamic populism is very important during the electoral contests only, which easily causes shifted 
factions of the oligarchy from one another. The result is that Islamists remain excluded from the 
dominant power structure even though they are increasingly visible in electoral politics and the 
attention they receive from researchers (Mudhoffir, 2020). Populism movements in many ways do not 
always represent a fundamental challenge to the status quo, they are even absorbed by the status quo. 
Thus, what happens in Indonesia is the reign of competition between oligarchs using the means of 
Islamic populism. Oligarchy is domesticating and absorbing the Islamic populism in Indonesia for 
long-term interests (Robison & Hadiz, 2020). 
With regard to the researches undertaken previously, it discloses that the conditions and failures 
of the Islamic populism in major cities, encourages the urgent switch of views to the movement of 
Islamic populism in rural areas, which Adiwilaga said in previous researches as the basis of mainstream 
Islam. Another assumption that makes it important to study the Islamic populism in rural areas is that 
the Muslim alliance is more established than urban populism. Moreover, the Islamic populism in rural 
areas has a competitive relationship with the urban populism in terms of discourse friction, issues and 
symbols that it carries. This last assumption is the possibility to see whether the failure of Islamic 
populism in urban areas is also due to the influence of challenges from Islamic populism in the rural 
areas. 
Indeed, this research is very important for it uses a different approach compared to the previous 
ones though they as well studied populism. Nicos Mouzelis (1985) views populism as an institutional 
approach, namely an alliance that seeks to bypass the formal institution of politics which aims to 
directly bringing people closer to power. Ernesto Laclau (2005) chose the discourse approach stating 
that populism in relation to how the lower society is represented as a whole (populist) through 
processes related to language where differences are homogenized so that they become unified. The 
language process is a list of symbolic meanings of speeches from charismatic or demagogical leaders. 
More specifically, Islamic populism according to Vedi Hadiz (2016) based on the economic-political 
approach, clarifies the position of Islamic populism in a diametric way against the ruling and bourgeois 
elites who enjoy the fruits of globalization, modernization, capitalism, liberalism and democracy. 
This research approach in Islamic populism though seizes the socio-cultural perspective to explain 
how social and traditional bases show the strength of the suspense of difference in rural community 
alliances whose aim is to focus on issues of unity and peace, instead of taking positions against power 
and issues of injustice such as urban Islamic populism. Thus, this research highlights not only the 
strength of the Islamic populism in the rural areas, but also provides a perspective that can complement 
the study of Islamic populism in Indonesia. 
In order to explore how the power of Islamic populism in rural areas develops, this research uses 
the concept of cultural reproduction initiated by Pierre Bourdieu (1993), It has become a unitary concept 
to analyze how a culture becomes the dominant culture in society. This concept cannot be separated 
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from Bourdieu's core concepts of habitus, capital and arena (P. Bourdieu, 1992). In general, this habitus 
provides the following characteristics: it shapes our world view, beliefs and values; our inclinations 
toward certain practices and values influenced by our trajectory culture; habitus is durable and mobile; 
habitus is arbitrary and not fully realized (Webb, Schirato, & Danaher, 2002). The concept of habitus is 
used to trace the common sense that exists in the alliance of ummah in rural areas in the form of beliefs 
represented by language symbols in the form of "practical taxonomy" (Jenkins, 1992), and it includes a 
cultural tendency to convey certain things, a specific linguistic competence, and the social capacities to 
use that competence appropriately. 
The concept of capital is the accumulation of labor that can be used for social adjustment (P 
Bourdieu, 1998). According to Bourdieu, capital as a structural basis is not limited to economic factors 
for there are other factors too, namely cultural, social and symbolic capital. Cultural capital is related 
to the objectification of culture; social capital is related to social connections; economic capital refers to 
the availability of material while the symbolic capital is in the form of social authority / legitimacy. Like 
habitus, capital is not an autonomous condition (P Bourdieu, 1986). The value of a capital is highly 
dependent on the habitus which is the objective structure of society. Not all capital can be recognized 
as a material form to gain or strengthen power. In comparison, when capital is in accordance with the 
habitus, it can be converted from one capital to another. For this reason, all capital is convertible, 
meaning that each capital can trigger the emergence of other capitals, so that it becomes a socially 
legitimate force (Mahar, Harker, & Wilkes, 1990). This concept of capital will be used to trace the 
accumulation of capital that exists in this Muslim alliance. 
The concept of arena will be later used as a perspective to observe the possibility of alliance elites 
who appear as the dominant symbol in producing and reproducing cultures with the ummah. The 
ummah alliances such as jamiah perceived from the perspective of Bourdieu (1995) are a space to 
maintain positions both by the alliance elites and the general public, especially when dealing with other 
alliances outside the group. The process of cultural reproduction in the arena in the form of an alliance 
of ummah will be explained more deeply through the Bourdieu’s concept of inculcation and 
apropiation (Pierre Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990) as a mechanism of socialization and legitimacy that 
goes hand in hand with perception and appreciation in the arena with a process that is continually 
repeated so that it becomes a common habitus. The process of inculcation and apropiation can provide 
an understanding that the habitus formed in social actors can occur through reciprocal mechanisms, 
namely structuring structures and structured structures. 
 The theoretical scheme of using Bourdieu's concept in this study can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
As far as the approach and theory are concerned, this study uses a qualitative method. The process 
of collecting data through participant observation was conducted by digging deeper through 
interviews with the alliance leaders and ummah from the middle and lower class, totaling 7 people. 
The chosen ummah alliance is in the form of the Majelis Sholawat Syubbanul Muslimin, headquartered 
in Kalikajar Rural areas, Paiton District, Probolinggo Regency. The main reasons behind such choice 
include: first, the alliance was followed by people from various walks of life as the social basis; second, 
Figure 1 Conceptual schema of Islamic populism research in rural areas 
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the alliance had an increasing followers of  tens of thousands of people; third, the alliance grows from 
the rural community. The data analysis of this study was carried out in an interpretive-reflexive manner 
(P Bourdieu, 2003) through categorization, condensation, cross check and assessing various 
impressions (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). 
2. Experience of the Majelis Sholawat Syubbanul Muslimin  
"Blessed sholawat, immoral fleeing" is one of the taglines echoed by the assembly as observed on 
its attributes such as banners, flyers and books which record history since the inception of Syubbanul 
Muslimin in 2005 until now. This tagline was previously popularized by Habib Syech bin Abdul Qodir 
Asyegaf, founder of the Majelis Sholawat Ahbabul Mustofa in Solo. At the beginning of its formation, 
the assembly founded by Kiai Hafidzul Hakiem Noer who is known as Kiai Hafidz intentionally invited 
the youths who lived in Kalikajar Rural areas, Paiton District to make an association with the activity 
of praising the Prophet Muhammad or better known as sholawat or prayer. 
Despite the initial goal of the association which was to target young people, as the jargon of the 
"millennial sholawat" it carries, elderly people are also enthusiastic to join. This could be due to the 
content of prayer performed by Kiai Hafidz accompanied by the Syubbanul Muslimin Group, 
containing pop qosidah-qosidah sholawat which are viral on Youtube in composing Islamic songs 
arranged by Indonesian pop songs or koplo. Kiai Hafidz though emphasizes the sholawat muktabaroh 
which is recognized among scholars, especially the nahdliyin scholars, such as Simtudduror, Dibaiyah, 
Barzanji and Burdah. 
The Sanad Alliance 
Developed within the community where one of its features is based on boarding school and 
nahdliyin residents, Sanad (the structure of the source of knowledge from teachers to the Prophet 
Muhammad) has become so important (Subekti, 2017). Sanad is believed by the community as a 
guarantee for the usefulness of knowledge and reading that is considered as sacred. The community 
knows the existence of Sanad from one's journey in learning, to whom the person studies (Naim, 
Personal Communication, June 7, 2020). This prayer council was recognized by Kiai Hafidz to read the 
prayers which continued to the Prophet Muhammad. Sanad was obtained by Kiai Hafidz while 
studying in Tarim, Yemen to Habib Salim Asyatiri whose scientific knowledge was continued to Habib 
Alawi Al Maliki and also continued to Habib Salim's father, Habib Abdullah Bin Umar to the author of 
the Sholawat Simtutduror, habib ali al habsyi to the Prophet Muhammad (Hafidz, Personal 
Communication, June 10, 2020). 
Guarding the Local Traditions and NU Traditions 
This prayer council develops by embracing the NU tradition and the local Javanese traditions 
which have been conducted from generation to generation by the rural communities in Probolinggo 
(Huda, 2018). Prayer has become a sacred tradition of the society in hope to obtain what they have 
expected in leading a convenient life in this world and in the hereafter. The hope of salvation is 
manifested in the prayers’ recitation during rituals performed in pregnancy, childbirth, business 
opening, marriage, farming and rural areas preservation (Muawanah & Hidayah, 2017). As a matter of 
fact, the Assembly simply followed the tradition that had long been rooted in society in large forms. 
What we carry out in this assembly is simply hoping to continue the traditions that had been 
carried out by the community made by the scholars. I think in Indonesia this tradition has existed 
since the days of wali Songo (Hafidz, Personal Communication, June 15, 2020). 
The tradition formulated in the activities of Syubbanul Muslimin was stated by Kiai Hafidz in order 
to fortify the community from the teachings of the group that divided the cleric and the Muslims by 
eliminating certain local traditions that were the legacy of previous scholars. 
.... A group that often disbelieves Muslims and diverts the NU's amaliyah, usually aims to seize the 
political power (Hafidz, Personal Communication, June 20, 2020). 
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Fostering Moral and Love for the Motherland 
This assembly was also supported by other background due to the existence of hardship 
experienced by the rural areas who are considered by religious elites to perform immoral acts, such as 
drunkenness, drug use, theft, fights, adultery and affairs. The existence of this assembly has an 
attraction for youths in rural areas and the wider community to join and stop their immoral habits and 
embrace the hope of salvation by joining this assembly together. One of the interviewees on behalf of 
Aris (26) said: 
I still remember back in 2011, when I was drunk riding a motorcycle. The next incident was, I hit 
the Syubban convoy on Alas Sumur road. Later, I found out from people that I immediately 
challenged them to a fight. But then the community secured them and brought home those who 
were injured hands and feet. The next day Kiai Hafidz and several other people visited me, gave 
me money and presented me with a koko shirt and wrapping cloth. At that time I felt embarrassed 
and the following days I was very curious to learn about the Syubban activities in hope to join 
them (Aris, Personal Communication, July 12, 2020).  
Public sympathy for Syubbanul Muslimin is based on the moral teachings conducted in the 
assembly. Such moral teaching is in conformity with the Islamic religious law, local traditions and the 
spirit of preserving the unity of the Indonesian homeland. 
Thus, we always remind the members to uphold the love of sholawat in hope to emulate the morals 
of Rosulullah, to get the syafaat Rosulullah so that we can embrace good morals. ....... As for the love 
of the country, apart from conveying it in our lecture, we also make it a part of every Syubban 
Muslimin event to sing the national hymn of ‘Indonesia Raya and Syubbanul Wathon’ (Hafidz, 
Personal Communication, June 22, 2020). 
Pay attention to the word syafaat which means intercession. This statement is the key that by 
reading the prayer or the sholawat, one can get help (intercession) magically from the Prophet 
Muhammad to improve morals and peace for the Indonesian homeland. 
Diverse Social Bases 
At every event, the current followers of the Syubbanul Muslimin Assembly, as claimed by the Field 
Coordinator, Syakur, reach tens of thousands of worshipers dominated by the rural communities (as 
seen in figure 2). In addition, middle-class society such as teachers, lecturers, students, local elites, local 
businessmen and religious elites are also part of this assembly (Syakur, Personal Communication, June 
30, 2020). They take part in the Syubbanul Muslimin activities while aiming to increase their love for the 
Prophet Muhammad as well as feeling the benefits of serenity in life. Hasan (38), who works as a 
lecturer, tells his story about how he joined the assembly: 
There was a time when I had trouble in sleeping. Thinking too much makes my life restless. I don't 
know how, but all of the sudden, I saw several pick-up cars carrying a group of people heading 
somewhere. I asked the people around them, and they said that there was a Syubban prayer event. 
It was already during night time, I was thinking to attend the event. During the event I felt 
something different. Even after the program, I still could feel the impact and when I arrived home 
around half past one in the morning, I tried to lie down on my bed. Thank you God, I can rest 
again. Until now. (Hasan, Personal Communication, July 13, 2020) 
Besides, the assembly attracted bikers’ communities such as CB motorcycle, Vespa motorbike, 
motor trail and bicycles to join the prayer sacred meeting. Sometimes they joined events held by other 
communities, but at other times, they held their own event together with Kiai Hafidz and the Syubbanul 
Muslimin group (Haq, 2019).  
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Ummah Donation  
The funding source of the event usually comes from the host who organizes the event, and from 
other hosts who invite the Majelis Sholawat Syubbanul Muslimin outside the normal schedule. Hosts 
are usually people from the middle class society. One event may cost six to fifteen million, depending 
on how the host wants to set the event and the invited speakers (Syakur, Personal Communication, 
June 30, 2020). 
Other sources of funding include: (1) the organization has a YouTube channel with an average 
income of 30 million rupiah per month; (2) tithes collected during the event provided to pick-up car 
drivers to transport the members; and (3) income from selling sacred water, merchandise, and 
Syubbanul Muslimin attributes managed by the Syubban Shop with a turnover reaching 200 million 
rupiah per year (Haq, 2019).  
3. The Capital Trajectory of Islamic Populism in Rural Areas  
The real strength of the alliance lies in their financial capital structural analysis (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2017). Bourdieu (1977) reminds that capital here cannot be merely associated with a set of 
material. Capital, for him, can be cultural, social, symbolic and economic. It is even revealed that 
cultural capital is the main force in producing and reproducing the habitus of social actors (P. Bourdieu, 
1993). This section focuses on the trajectory of Islamic populism in rural areas which is meant to analyze 
its ability of suspense of difference through the experience of the Syubbanul Muslimin Assembly. The 
easiest way to undertake such step regarding the capital trajectories is that it will be divided into four 
categories based on Bourdieu’s capital concept. 
Symbolic Power: Legitimate Text of Sholawat and Sanad 
Symbolic capital is thought to have the strongest influence as a source of dominant legitimacy 
(Mahar et al., 1990). The strong influence of the Sanad symbolization obtained by Kiai Hafid through 
his learning journey from a teacher known as the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, can convince 
various social strata in acknowledging the blessings from the prayer recitation event that they embrace. 
The submission of the ummah is indicated by the symbolization of body movements when uttering 
prayers at certain passages. The symbolization is shown by pointing finger to the sky when calling the 
word "Allah" and raising one's hand to the sky when outpouring meaningful prayer asking for 
salvation (figure 3). Referring to the concept of symbolic power (Edelman, Bourdieu, Thompson, 
Raymond, & Adamson, 1992), the facts that occur in Islamic populism in rural areas have been united 
by the dominance of the prayer passage, which is legitimized by Sanad, so that speech and movement 
can be carried out together no matter what their social bases are. 
Figure 2 Ummah alliance in the Majelis Sholawat Syubbanul Muslimin 
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Figure 3 Symbol pointing to the sky led by religious elites 
The use of internalized traditions in society  
Traditional praying practices had existed for a long time, even before the spread of Islam in 
Indonesia (Fauzi, 2012). In Indonesia, prayer texts are met with traditional greetings which also have 
quite old historical roots (Muawanah & Hidayah, 2017). Each tradition has a set of sublime meanings 
which are believed to lead to a good life as belief in the great traditions of the world (Zhoukuan, 2017). 
Islamic populism in countryside is based on traditions that had previously existed within the 
community and gathered in a bigger alliance. Thus, it is not hard for the Islamic populism in the rural 
areas to develop larger in quantity, since the activities that is carried out is part of the ummah habitus 
of life that is easily recognized, containing the meaning that they believe as a blessing. 
Uniting Diverse Social Bases 
What is populism? Hadiz (2016) explained this term according to social basis which represents one 
of the most important conditions in populism. More precisely, various social bases are united to reach 
a common goal. Bourdieu first saw that social capital network is seen as a power that appears as a 
manifestation of power over symbolic power and cultural power in society (P Bourdieu, 1986). This 
power is shown by Islamic populism in rural areas embedding diverse social bases from the middle 
class, which is supported by a large number of people from the lower classes. The various layers are 
united in the ummah alliance that carries a moral movement by highlighting the love of sholawat, as a 
universal language to be easily understood by all people. 
 Economic Capital Conversion  
Islamic populism in the rural areas does not see economic factors as the most important condition 
above other capitals. The existence of economic capital is not a goal. It is only a tool in achieving 
common goals by converting them into support to strengthen the goals of the ummah alliance, such as 
transportation fees, accommodation needs, and event festivities. What can be ascertained is that all of 
the economic capital that was at stake in this community alliance would not return to the people in any 
material form, but in the form of enthusiasm for the realization of the hope of salvation after they have 
completed a series of rituals. Islamic populism in the rural areas seem to have understood Bourdieu's 
point that economic capital is most easily converted into other capital (P Bourdieu, 1986). So, they 
convert all sources of funding they get to fund the common goals.  
4. Reproducing the Imagination of Salvation 
The purpose of Islamic populism in rural areas is salvation. This goal is reproduced during the 
lesson after prayer which explains the importance of prayer in order to uphold intercession from the 
Prophet Muhammad so that he is saved in this world and in the afterlife; and this nation is safe for 
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people to live peacefully while carrying out worships and live in harmony with each other. The 
dominant discourse is the "imagination of salvation" which colors and shapes the habitus of the 
ummah. 
The imagination of salvation has become a universal language which is translated into various 
kinds of repeated information, stories, and doctrines. A kind of practical taxonomy is that by 
performing a prayer, listening to advice from religious elites, funding prayer activities, can lead to the 
salvation of oneself, family, community and nation. Bourdieu called this reproduction process as 
inculcation by emphasizing the euphemized language that is sacred, polite and worthy to be spoken 
and conveyed to the family and the public. In addition to the process of inculcation through 
euphemistic language, according to Bourdieu, there is also a process of inculcation through sensory 
(Pierre Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990) which is manifested in body language by displaying exemplary 
models shown by religious elites. The appearance of being calm, focused (special), polite and 
understated during assembly activities is a sensory language that often appears. 
This reproduction process does not stop at the action of instilling it to ummah. What can be found 
in the activities of Islamic populism in this rural area is the occurrence of appreciation, which is 
indicated by perception and appreciation (Pierre Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Perception can be 
explained through the responses as a result of the involvement of social actors in this alliance to the 
imagination of salvation, as conveyed by Hasan in the sub-chapter of the experience of the Majelis 
Sholawat Syubbanul Muslimin. Hasan felt the serenity as a part of the salvation after joining the 
assembly. So, Hasan came to the assembly at another time with appreciation through the spoken and 
body language. The spoken language is expressed by reading the prayer texts together with other 
followers, led by the religious elite, while the body language mimics the body language demonstrated 
by the religious elite as well as other followers. Readings and movements that are carried out 
simultaneously in this community alliance, become a parade which signifies the reproduction of the 
habitus of salvation imagination that continues over and over again at every Syubbanul Muslimin 
event. 
5. Antagonism of Islamic Populism in Rural areas 
Laclau linked populism with antagonism. The thesis proposed that within populism, there is 
always antagonism which is the main characteristic of populism (Laclau, 2005). As explained in 
previous studies regarding populism in major cities, that is characterized by an alliance of ummah who 
always take positions against the ruling elite with the aim of accessing and gaining power because they 
are considered to have broken the promise of justice. It is clear that antagonism is the main sense of 
Islamic populism in big cities. 
Supporting the research undertaken by Laclau, this study found the sense of antagonism which 
underlies the Islamic populism in rural areas; however, it is not the main striking feature of the Islamic 
populism movement in rural areas. According to the observations and information from the subject, 
this study sees that antagonism is only an inset material in the lectures and daily conversations of the 
people’s alliance. The main part is to fortify the people by guarding the tradition from deviant beliefs. 
It is better to be busy saving the community by guiding them to preserve the tradition of nahdliyin 
and spread the teachings of peace, than to spend time discussing those who have always failed to 
attack us with their heretics and provocative invitations that disintegrate the nation (Hafidz, 
Personal Communication, June 10, 2020). 
Indirectly, the expressed language shows the existence of a cold war of Islamic populism in large 
cities and in rural areas. This side of antagonism causes populism in major cities to fail because it gains 
resistance from rural populism with a larger number of followers (NU) though it is not a face to face 
resistance. Undoubtedly, its style differs from the Islamic populism in urban areas as its opponents. 
The strategy conducted by the ummah alliance in rural areas is about survival since the values 
developed solely focus on moderation, adaptation and tolerance, which is consequently apathetic 
sometimes for the opponents or at any time to respond with satire style. 
Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya 4, 4 (2020): 239-250 249 dari 250 
Rojabi Azharghany, Hotman Siahaan, Akh. Muzakki/Alliance of Ummah in Rural Areas: A New Perspective on Islamic Populism in 
Indonesia 
6. Conclusions 
The ummah alliance in rural areas is another type of Islamic populism that can unify various 
elements and social strata from middle to lower classes with the aim of spreading the words of 
salvation, peace and unity. It is very different from the Islamic populism in major cities which take a 
more opposing position and voices the injustice of other groups. The resilience of Islamic populism in 
rural areas is shown by the complexity of capital with the support of strong cultural capital, because it 
has been rooted for so long in the society as a habitus. The complexity of capital is continually 
reproduced into a social habitus in the form of "the imagination of salvation". The reproduction process 
by utilizing the universal language of religion for the imagination of salvation can be properly 
understood by the people, so that the impact is more stable in maintaining the suspense of difference 
between various social bases. The next important thing is, the stronghold of the tradition of Islamic 
populism in the rural areas is more effective compared to the antagonism of direct resistance in facing 
Islamic populism in cities, which indirectly causes the failure of Islamic populism in cities. 
This research provides a complementary contribution to the study of the discourse on Islamic 
populism in Indonesia. It is hoped that the study of Islamic populism will not only be centered on an 
urban basis which tends to use a political-economy approach considering that the essence of populism 
is a suspense of difference of various mass bases. In addition, studies that tend to lead Islamic populism 
towards a frontal movement can create Islamic phobia, which has a negative impact on the discourse 
of peace in the life of the nation, state and society.  
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